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e conversion price was 9；815 per Berkshire share； a 15％ premium to the market price then existing。 Berkshire can call the bonds at any time after September 28； 1992 at their accreted value （the original issue price plus 5。5％ pounded semi…annually） and on two specified days； September 28 of 1994 and 1999； the bondholders can require Berkshire to buy the securities at their accreted value。
这次发行的债券面额是10；000美元，每张债券可以申请转换为0。4515股的Berkshire股份，因为每张债券的发行价大约是4；431美元，所以代表转换为Berkshire的价格大概是9；815美元，约为现在市价15％的溢价，同时Berkshire有权在1992年9月28日以后加计利息（5。5％的年利率）赎回这些债券，至于债券持有人也有权在1994年与1999年的9月28日要求公司加计利息买回其所持有的债券。
For tax purposes； Berkshire is entitled to deduct the 5。5％ interest accrual each year； even though we make no payments to the bondholders。 Thus the net effect to us； resulting from the reduced taxes； is positive cash flow。 That is a very significant benefit。 Some unknowable variables prevent us from calculating our exact effective rate of interest； but under all circumstances it will be well below 5。5％。 There is meanwhile a symmetry to the tax law： Any taxable holder of the bonds must pay tax each year on the 5。5％ interest； even though he receives no cash。
就税负的观点而言，虽然没有马上支付利息，但Berkshire每年仍可享受5。5％利息支出的所得税扣抵，由于减少了税负支出，所以就现金流量的角度而言，我们每年还有现金净流入，这是一项不错的好处，当然一些不可知的变处，使我们无法确定这次发行真正的资金成本，但不管怎样，应该都低于5。5％，而相对的债券持有人每年还是要支付5。5％的利息所得税，虽然他们根本没有收到任何的现金利息收入。
Neither our bonds nor those of certain other panies that issued similar bonds last year （notably Loews and Motorola） resemble the great bulk of zero…coupon bonds that have been issued in recent years。 Of these； Charlie and I have been； and will continue to be； outspoken critics。 As I will later explain； such bonds have often been used in the most deceptive of ways and with deadly consequences to investors。 But before we tackle that subject； let's travel back to Eden； to a time when the apple had not yet been bitten。
去年我们与其它公司所发行的类似债券（尤其是Loews与摩托罗拉公司），与这几年盛行的零息债券有相当大的差异，对于后者，查理跟我一直有相当的意见，后面我会再详加说明，我们认为这些债券隐藏着欺骗行为，对买下他们的投资人有相当不利的影响，不过在谈论这个话题之前，让我们回溯时光到亚当还未引诱夏娃啃下苹果之前的时代。
If you're my age you bought your first zero…coupon bonds during World War II； by purchasing the famous Series E U。 S。 Savings Bond； the most widely…sold bond issue in history。 （After the war； these bonds were held by one out of two U。 S。 households。） Nobody； of course； called the Series E a zero…coupon bond； a term in fact that I doubt had been invented。 But that's precisely what the Series E was。
如果你像我这样的年纪曾在二次世界大战期间第一次买进最有名的E系列美国储蓄零息债券，（这种广为流传的债券几乎每两个家庭最会有人持有），当然在当时没有人会把它当作是零息债券的一种，因为这名词根本就还未出现，但基本上它就是一种零息债券。
These bonds came in denominations as small as 18。75。 That amount purchased a 25 obligation of the United States government due in 10 years； terms that gave the buyer a pounded annual return of 2。9％。 At the time； this was an attractive offer： the 2。9％ rate was higher than that generally available on Government bonds and the holder faced no market…fluctuation risk； since he could at any time cash in his bonds with only a minor reduction in interest。
这种债券的面额最小的只有18。75美元，买下10年后美国政府必须偿还25美元，投资人大概可以获得2。9％的年投资报酬率，在当时这是相当不错的一项投资，2。9％的年利率远高于普通的政府债券利率，且持有人不必担心利率波动的风险，而且他可以随时予以变现，利息不会被打折太多。
A second form of zero…coupon U。 S。 Treasury issue； also benign and useful； surfaced in the last decade。 One problem with a normal bond is that even though it pays a given interest rate … say 10％ … the holder cannot be assured that a pounded 10％ return will be realized。 For that rate to materialize； each semi…annual coupon must be reinvested at 10％ as it is received。 If current interest rates are； say； only 6％ or 7％ when these coupons e due； the holder will be unable to pound his money over the life of the bond at the advertised rate。 For pension funds or other investors with long…term liabilities； 〃reinvestment risk〃 of this type can be a serious problem。 Savings Bonds might have solved it； except that they are issued only to individuals and are unavailable in large denominations。 What big buyers needed was huge quantities of 〃Savings Bond Equivalents。〃
第二种形式的美国国库零息债券出现在十几年前，也相当的不错，一般的债券有一个很大的问题，那就是虽然它的票面是10％，但持有人却不一定能够保证就能得到10％的报酬率，因为要能获得10％的话就必须所收到的10％利息收入也能再运用投资也能得到10％以上才行，若是所得的利息之后只能得到6％或7％的报酬，则最后结算的报酬率可能没有办法达到10％的预定利率，这对于退休基金或是其它具有长期负债的投资者来说，再投资所可能遇到的风险可能是一个很严重的问题，储蓄债券则可以解决这样的问题，只可惜它只能发行给个人而且面额都不大，对于大买家来说，它们需要的是类似这种储蓄债券的替代品。
Enter some ingenious and； in this case； highly useful investment bankers （led； I'm happy to say； by Salomon Brothers）。 They created the instrument desired by 〃stripping〃 the semi…annual coupons from standard Government issues。 Each coupon； once detached； takes on the essential character of a Savings Bond since it represents a single sum due sometime in the future。 For example； if you strip the 40 semi…annual coupons from a U。 S。 Government Bond due in the year 2010； you will have 40 zero…coupon bonds； with maturities from six months to 20 years； each of which can then be bundled with other coupons of like maturity and marketed。 If current interest rates are； say； 10％ for all maturities； the six…month issue will sell for 95。24％ of maturity value and the 20…year issue will sell for 14。20％。 The purchaser of any given maturity is thus guaranteed a pounded rate of 10％ for his entire holding period。 Stripping of government bonds has occurred on a large scale in recent years； as long…term investors； rangin