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An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting。 Because weekday parking can be tight around the Orpheum； we have lined up a number of nearby lots for our shareholders to use。 The attachment also contains information about them。
后面附有股东会开会投票的相关资料，跟各位解释如何拿到入场所许的识别证，因为开会当天会场不好停车，我们特地为大家预留了一些位置，附件也有相关说明供大家参考。
As usual； we will have buses to take you to Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you to downtown hotels or to the airport later。 I hope that you will allow plenty of time to fully explore the attractions of both stores。 Those of you arriving early can visit the Furniture Mart any day of the week； it is open from 10 a。m。 to 5：30 p。m。 on Saturdays； and from noon to 5：30 p。m。 on Sundays。
一如往常，会后我们备有巴士带大家到内布拉斯加家具店与波仙珠宝店或是到饭店与机场，我希望大家能有多一点的时间好好探索这两家店的奥妙，当然早几天到的股东也可利用假日逛逛家具店，星期六从早上10点到下午5点30分，星期日则从中午开到下午5点30分。
Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday； but we will open for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p。m。 on Sunday； April 29th。 Ike likes to put on a show； and you can rely on him to produce something very special for our shareholders。
波仙星期天通常不开门营业，但在股东会期间特别破例，4月29日星期天从中午开到下午6点，Ike特地为股东们准备了一场秀，相信他一定可以让大家见识到一些特别的东西。
In this letter we've had a lot to say about rates of pounding。 If you can bear having your own rate turn negative for a day … not a pretty thought； I admit … visit Ike on the 29th。
今年我们提到很多次有关复利的事，若是你能忍受个人净值暂时倒退一天的话，虽然不建议常常这样做，记得在29号去看看Ike的秀吧！
一九九零
Last year we made a prediction： 〃A reduction ＇in Berkshire's net worth＇ is almost certain in at least one of the next three years。〃 During much of 1990's second half； we were on the road to quickly proving that forecast accurate。 But some strengthening in stock prices late in the year enabled us to close 1990 with net worth up by 362 million； or 7。3％。 Over the last 26 years （that is； since present management took over） our per…share book value has grown from 19。46 to 4；612。06； or at a rate of 23。2％ pounded annually。
去年我们曾经预测过，Berkshire的净值在未来的三年内有可能会减少，结果在1990年的下半年我们差点就证明了这项预测的真实性，还好年底前股票价格的上涨使得我们公司的净值，还是较前一个年度增加7。3％，约3。62亿美元；而总计过去26年以来（也就是自从现有经营阶层接手后），每股净值从19元成长到现在的4；612美元，年复合成长率约为23。2％。
Our growth rate was lackluster in 1990 because our four major mon stock holdings； in aggregate； showed little change in market value。 Last year I told you that though these panies … Capital Cities/ABC； Coca…Cola； GEICO； and Washington Post … had fine businesses and superb managements； widespread recognition of these attributes had pushed the stock prices of the four to lofty levels。 The market prices of the two media panies have since fallen significantly … for good reasons relating to evolutionary industry developments that I will discuss later … and the price of Coca…Cola stock has increased significantly for what I also believe are good reasons。 Overall； yearend 1990 prices of our 〃permanent four；〃 though far from enticing； were a bit more appealing than they were a year earlier。
1990年成长之所以减缓的原因主要是因为我们四个主要的股票投资市值加总并没有多大的变动所致，去年我曾向各位表示，虽然这些公司…资本城/ABC、可口可乐、GEICO保险与华盛顿邮报等，拥有良好的企业体质与经营阶层，但是因为这些特点现在已广为投资大众所认同，所以也促使公司股价推升到一个颇高的价位；另外其中两家媒体事业之后的股价又大幅滑落，原因在于后面我会再详细叙述该产业革命性的演进，另外可口可乐的股价也因为我个人也相当认同的原因为大众所接受而大涨，不过总的来说，目前这四大天王的股价，虽然不够吸引人，但比起一年以前来说，要算是合理的多。
Berkshire's 26…year record is meaningless in forecasting future results； so also； we hope； is the one…year record。 We continue to aim for a 15％ average annual gain in intrinsic value。 But； as we never tire of telling you； this goal bees ever more difficult to reach as our equity base； now 5。3 billion； increases。
Berkshire过去26年来辉煌的记录并不足以确保未来也会如此发展，当然我们也希望过去一年惨痛的记录也不能代表未来的结果就是如此，我们还是依旧将目标订在每年15％的实质价值成长率，只是还有一点是过去从未向各位报告的，以我们现在的股权规模，要完成这项任务的门槛是53亿美金！
If we do attain that 15％ average； our shareholders should fare well。 However； Berkshire's corporate gains will produce an identical gain for a specific shareholder only if he eventually sells his shares at the same relationship to intrinsic value that existed when he bought them。 For example； if you buy at a 10％ premium to intrinsic value； if intrinsic value subsequently grows at 15％ a year； and if you then sell at a 10％ premium； your own return will correspondingly be 15％ pounded。 （The calculation assumes that no dividends are paid。） If； however； you buy at a premium and sell at a smaller premium； your results will be somewhat inferior to those achieved by the pany。
要是我们真的能够达到这样的目标，那么我们的股东一定赚翻了，因为Berkshire的企业获利将会为那些买卖价格与公司实质价值一致的投资人创造相同的获利，举例来说，如果你以实质价值10％的溢价买进Berkshire股份，假设后来公司实质价值每年成长了15％，而之后你同样以实质价值10％的溢价卖出所持有的股份，则你的投资年报酬率应该也会是15％（这个例子假设期间公司并未发放任何股利），当然要是后来你以低于10％的溢价卖出股份的话，那么你最后所得到的投资报酬率可能就会低于公司同期间15％的报酬率。
Ideally； the results of every Berkshire shareholder would closely mirror those of the pany during his period of ownership。 That is why Charlie Munger； Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner； and I hope for Berkshire to sell consistently at about intrinsic value。 We prefer such steadiness to the value…ignoring volatility of the past two years： In 1989 intrinsic value grew less than did book value； which was up 44％； while the market price rose 85％； in 1990 book value and intrinsic value increased by a small amount； while the market price fell