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inst a single catastrophe； such as a tornado or hurricane； that produces losses from a large number of policies。 In these contracts； the primary insurer might retain the loss from a single event up to a maximum of； say； 10 million； buying various layers of reinsurance above that level。 When losses exceed the retained amount； the reinsurer typically pays 95％ of the excess up to its contractual limit； with the primary insurer paying the remainder。 （By requiring the primary insurer to keep 5％ of each layer； the reinsurer leaves him with a financial stake in each loss settlement and guards against his throwing away the reinsurer's money。）
然而我们对于价格合理的生意胃口却很足够，1989年有一件事可以说明，那就是CAT防护，也就是一般保险公司（也包含再保公司本身）都会向再保公司签约买下再保合约，来免于承担像是龙卷风或是飓风等单一意外事件所可能引发钜额损失的风险，在这些再保合约中，原始的保险公司可能会保留一个单一的损失上限，例如1；000万美金，然后在此之上买进好几层的再保险，当损失超过自留的部份时，再保公司依规定就要支付超过的部份，最高比例可达95％，（之所以要求保险公司本身每层保留5％，是为了让保险公司与再保公司站在同一阵线，避免保险公司慷再保公司之凯）。
CAT covers are usually one…year policies that also provide for one automatic reinstatement； which requires a primary insurer whose coverage has been exhausted by a catastrophe to buy a second cover for the balance of the year in question by paying another premium。 This provision protects the primary pany from being 〃bare〃 for even a brief period after a first catastrophic event。 The duration of 〃an event〃 is usually limited by contract to any span of 72 hours designated by the primary pany。 Under this definition； a wide…spread storm； causing damage for three days； will be classified as a single event if it arises from a single climatic cause。 If the storm lasts four days； however； the primary pany will file a claim carving out the 72 consecutive hours during which it suffered the greatest damage。 Losses that occurred outside that period will be treated as arising from a separate event。
CAT防护的保单通常是一年期，一般可以自动延长一年，这样的条款主要是保护保险公司避免因为重大灾害发生后，投保的空窗期，事件发生的持续期间通常由合约限定在72小时以内，在这种定义之下，一场持续三天的大风暴所造成的损害，可被归类为单一事件。要是大风暴持续四天以上，则保险公司可以切割出其受害最惨重的72小时，超过的部份则必须视为另一个独立的事件。
In 1989； two unusual things happened。 First； Hurricane Hugo generated 4 billion or more of insured loss； at a pace； however； that caused the vast damage in the Carolinas to occur slightly more than 72 hours after the equally severe damage in the Caribbean。 Second； the California earthquake hit within weeks； causing insured damage that was difficult to estimate； even well after the event。 Slammed by these two … or possibly three … major catastrophes； some primary insurers； and also many reinsurers that had themselves bought CAT protection； either used up their automatic second cover or became uncertain as to whether they had done so。
1989年有两件特殊的事件发生，第一Hugo飓风造成40亿美元的损失，不过之后不久72小时，又在加勒比海发生相同规模的灾害；第二加州大地震在几个礼拜内又接连发生，造成难以估计的损失，受到这两个事件严重的打击，或者应该说是三个，许多有买CAT防身的保险公司及再保公司，立刻使用第二次投保权。
At that point sellers of CAT policies had lost a huge amount of money … perhaps twice because of the reinstatements … and not taken in much in premiums。 Depending upon many variables； a CAT premium might generally have run 3％ to 15％ of the amount of protection purchased。 For some years； we've thought premiums of that kind inadequate and have stayed away from the business。
在当时许多卖CAT保单的业者亏了一屁股，尤其是第二次投保部份，根本收不到足够的保费，由于有许多变量，保费通常会是在保额的3％到15％不等，有好几年，我们认为这种保费收入并不合理，所以没有介入这个市场。
But because the 1989 disasters left many insurers either actually or possibly bare； and also left most CAT writers licking their wounds； there was an immediate shortage after the earthquake of much…needed catastrophe coverage。 Prices instantly became attractive； particularly for the reinsurance that CAT writers themselves buy。 Just as instantly； Berkshire Hathaway offered to write up to 250 million of catastrophe coverage； advertising that proposition in trade publications。 Though we did not write all the business we sought； we did in a busy ten days book a substantial amount。
但是1989年的大灾害使得许多CAT业者穷于填补保险客户的伤口，使得地震灾后保单供给发生短缺，保费价格很快地就回到相当吸引人的水准，尤其是再保公司本身自己所买的保单，若有需要，Berkshire可以马上就签下2。5亿美元以上的保单，虽然并不是所有上门的生意都接，但忙个十天下来所签的保单金额也是相当可观。
Our willingness to put such a huge sum on the line for a loss that could occur tomorrow sets us apart from any reinsurer in the world。 There are； of course； panies that sometimes write 250 million or even far more of catastrophe coverage。 But they do so only when they can； in turn； reinsure a large percentage of the business with other panies。 When they can't 〃lay off〃 in size； they disappear from the market。
世界上再没有其它再保公司会像我们一样，愿意一口气接受如此大金额的投保，当然也有保险公司偶尔会愿意接下二亿五美金的灾害理赔保险，但是其提通常是他们可以再向其它保险公司分保出去，当他们找不到分散风险的再保公司时，他们会马上退出市场。
Berkshire's policy； conversely； is to retain the business we write rather than lay it off。 When rates carry an expectation of profit； we want to assume as much risk as is prudent。 And in our case； that's a lot。
相反地Berkshire的政策则是保留大部分的保额而不是把他们给分配掉，当保险费率看起来有利可图，我们很愿意承担更多的风险，以外界的标准而言，那应该是个大数字。
We will accept more reinsurance risk for our own account than any other pany because of two factors： （1） by the standards of regulatory accounting； we have a net worth in our insurance panies of about 6 billion … the second highest amount in the United States； and （2） we simply don't care what earnings we report quarterly； or even annually； just as long as the decisions leading to those earnings （or losses） were reached intelligently。
我们之所以愿意承担比一般保险公司更多的风�