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Written （％） Dividends Losses （％） GNP Deflator （％）
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988（Est。）
3。8 3。7 5。0 8。5 22。1 22。2 9。4 3。9
106。0 109。6 112。0 118。0 116。3 108。0 104。6 105。4
6。5 8。4 6。8 16。9 16。1 13。5 7。8 4。2
9。6 6。4 3。8 3。7 3。2 2。7 3。3 3。6
Source： A。M。 Best Co。
The bined ratio represents total insurance costs （losses incurred plus expenses） pared to revenue from premiums： A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit； and one above 100 indicates a loss。 When the investment ine that an insurer earns from holding on to policyholders？funds （he float？ is taken into account； a bined ratio in the 107…111 range typically produces an overall break…even result； exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders。
综合比率代表的是保险的总成本（损失加上费用）占保费收入的比率，100以下代表会有承销利益，100以上代表会有承销损失，若把持有保费收入浮存金（扣除股东权益部份所产生的盈余）所产生的投资收益列入考量，损益两平的范围大概是在107…111之间。
For the reasons laid out in previous reports； we expect the industry incurred losses to grow by about 10％ annually； even in years when general inflation runs considerably lower。 If premium growth meanwhile materially lags that 10％ rate； underwriting losses will mount； though the industry tendency to under reserve when business turns bad may obscure their size for a time。 As the table shows； the industry underwriting loss grew in 1988。 This trend is almost certain to continue … and probably will accelerate … for at least two more years。
基于前几次年报所说明的理由，即使是通货膨胀在这几年来相对温和，我们预期保险业每年损失增加的比率约在10％左右，若是保费收入成长没有到达10％以上，损失一定会增加，虽然保险公司在景气不好时，会习惯性地将损失暂时隐藏起来，如附表所示，1988年产业整体的损失确实增加，而这个趋势应该会继续持续下去，甚至在未来两年还会加速恶化。
The property…casualty insurance industry is not only subnormally profitable； it is subnormally popular。 （As Sam Goldwyn philosophized： n life； one must learn to take the bitter with the sour。？ One of the ironies of business is that many relatively…unprofitable industries that are plagued by inadequate prices habitually find themselves beat upon by irate customers even while other； hugely profitable industries are spared plaints； no matter how high their prices。
产险业的获利情况不但是相当的低，而且也是不太受尊重的行业，（就像是山姆高德温曾说一个人要学会体验人生的苦与乐，不过这行很讽刺的是，做的要死要活的同时，还要被客户糟蹋，不像有些赚翻了的行业，东西明明贵的要死，却是一个愿打，一个愿挨）
Take the breakfast cereal industry； whose return on invested capital is more than double that of the auto insurance industry （which is why panies like Kellogg and General Mills sell at five times book value and most large insurers sell close to book）。 The cereal panies regularly impose price increases； few of them related to a significant jump in their costs。 Yet not a peep is heard from consumers。 But when auto insurers raise prices by amounts that do not even match cost increases； customers are outraged。 If you want to be loved； it clearly better to sell high…priced corn flakes than low…priced auto insurance。
以早餐麦片为例，它的资产报酬率是汽车保险业的一倍（这也是为什么家乐氏与通用磨坊的股价净值比是五倍，而保险业者的股价净值比仅为一倍），麦片公司常常在调整产品售价，即便其生产成本没什么变，但消费者却连一个屁都不吭一声，但要是换做是保险业者，就算只是反映成本稍微调整一下价格，保户马上就会生气地跳起来，所以若你识相，最好是选择去卖高价的玉米片，而不是低价的汽车保险。
The antagonism that the public feels toward the industry can have serious consequences： Proposition 103； a California initiative passed last fall； threatens to push auto insurance prices down sharply； even though costs have been soaring。 The price cut has been suspended while the courts review the initiative； but the resentment that brought on the vote has not been suspended： Even if the initiative is overturned； insurers are likely to find it tough to operate profitably in California。 （Thank heavens the citizenry isn mad at bonbons： If Proposition 103 applied to candy as well as insurance； See would be forced to sell its product for 5。76 per pound。 rather than the 7。60 we charge … and would be losing money by the bucketful。）
一般大众对于保险业的敌视会造成严重的后果，去年秋天加州通过的一项103提案，虽然成本一再上涨，却还威胁要将汽车保费价格大幅压低，所幸法院后来检视这项提案予以搁置，但这次投票所带来的冲击未曾稍减，保险业者在加州已很难再有营运获利的空间，（感谢老天还好加州人没有对巧克力糖果感到反感，若是103提案也如保险般适用于糖果的话，喜斯可能被迫以每磅5。76元而不是现在的每磅7。6元，果真如此，喜斯可能就要亏大钱了）
The immediate direct effects on Berkshire from the initiative are minor； since we saw few opportunities for profit in the rate structure that existed in California prior to the vote。 However； the forcing down of prices would seriously affect GEICO； our 44％…owned investee； which gets about 10％ of its premium volume from California。 Even more threatening to GEICO is the possibility that similar pricing actions will be taken in other states； through either initiatives or legislation。
对Berkshire来说，这项法案的短期影响不大，因为即使在这法案之前，加州现行的费率结构也很难让我找到有获利的商机，然而这项压低保费的做法却会直接影响到我们持有44％股权的GEICO，约有10％2的保费收入系来自加州，更具威胁的是若其它州，不管是透过提案或是立法的方式，也跟进采取类似的行动，
If voters insist that auto insurance be priced below cost； it eventually must be sold by government。 Stockholders can subsidize policyholders for a short period； but only taxpayers can subsidize them over the long term。 At most property…casualty panies； socialized auto insurance would be no disaster for shareholders。 Because of the modity characteristics of the industry； most insurers earn mediocre returns and therefore have little or no economic goodwill to lose if they are forced by government to leave the auto insurance business。 But GEICO； because it is a low…cost producer able to earn high returns on equity； has a huge amount of economic goodwill at risk。 In turn； so do we。
若民众坚持汽车保险费的价格一定要低于成本，则最后可能要由政府直接来负责，股东或可暂时支应保户，但只有纳税人可以长久地给予支助，对大部分的产物意外险业�