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The table on the following page shows the major sources of Berkshire's reported earnings。 In the table； amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase…price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply but； instead； are aggregated and shown separately。 In effect； this procedure presents the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them。 In appendixes to my letters in the 1983 and 1986 annual reports； I explained why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than the standard GAAP presentation； which makes purchase…price adjustments on a business…by business basis。 The total net earnings we show in the table are； of course； identical to the GAAP figures in our audited financial statements。 In the Business Segment Data on pages 36…38 and in the Management's Discussion section on pages 40…44 you will find much additional information about our businesses。 In these sections you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis。 I urge you to read that material； as well as Charlie Munger's letter to Wesco shareholders； describing the various businesses of that subsidiary； which starts on page 45。
在后面的部门别信息中，大家可以找到个别事业的详细信息，除此之外，我也强烈建议大家一定要看查理写给Wesco股东叙述其旗下事业情况的一封信
1987 Unit：US'000
Earnings Before Ine Tax After Ine Tax
Percent Total Berkshire Share Berkshire Share
Earnings from Operation
Insurance Group
Underwriting （55；429） （20；696）
Net Investment Ine 152；483 136；658
Buffalio News 39；410 21；304
Fechheimer 13；332 6；580
Kirby 22；408 12；891
Nebraska Furniture Mart 16；837 7；554
Scott Fetzer…Diversified 30；591 17；555
See's Candies 31；693 17；363
Wesco Financial Corporation…Parent 6；209 4；978
World Book 25；745 15；136
Amortization of Goodwill （2；862） （2；862）
Interest on Debt （11；474） （5；905）
Shareholder's Contribution （4；938） （2；963）
Other 16；914 7；152
0 280；919 214；745
Realized Securities Gain 27；319 19；807
Total Earnings…all entities 0 308；238 234；552
Gypsy Rose Lee在她晚年的一场生日宴会上宣布：「我还是拥有去年所有的一切，现在唯一的差别是全部都矮了两吋。」如同本表所示，在1987年几乎我们所有的事业都又成长的一岁。
Gypsy Rose Lee announced on one of her later birthdays： 〃I have everything I had last year； it's just that it's all two inches lower。〃 As the table shows； during 1987 almost all of our businesses aged in a more upbeat way。
我们旗下这些事业实在是没有什么新的变化可以特别提出报告的，所谓没有消息就是好消息，剧烈的变动通常不会有特别好的绩效，当然这与大部分的投资人认为的刚好相反，大家通常将最高的本益比给予那些擅长画大饼的企业，这些美好的远景会让投资人不顾现实经营的情况，而一昧幻想未来可能的获利美梦，对于这种爱做梦的投资人来说，任何路边的野花，都会比邻家的女孩来的具吸引力，不管后者是如何贤慧。
There's not a lot new to report about these businesses … and that's good； not bad。 Severe change and exceptional returns usually don't mix。 Most investors； of course； behave as if just the opposite were true。 That is； they usually confer the highest price…earnings ratios on exotic…sounding businesses that hold out the promise of feverish change。 That prospect lets investors fantasize about future profitability rather than face today's business realities。 For such investor…dreamers； any blind date is preferable to one with the girl next door； no matter how desirable she may be。
经验显示，能够创造盈余新高的企业，现在做生意的方式通常与其五年前甚至十年前没有多大的差异，当然管理当局绝对不能够太过自满，因为企业总有不断的机会可以改善本身的服务、产品线、制造能力等等，且绝对必须要好好把握，不过一家公司若是为了改变而改变，反而可能增加犯错的机会，讲的更深入一点，在一块动荡不安的土地之上，是不太可能建造一座固若金汤的城堡，而具有这样稳定特质的企业却是持续创造高获利的关键。
Experience； however； indicates that the best business returns are usually achieved by panies that are doing something quite similar today to what they were doing five or ten years ago。 That is no argument for managerial placency。 Businesses always have opportunities to improve service； product lines； manufacturing techniques； and the like； and obviously these opportunities should be seized。 But a business that constantly encounters major change also encounters many chances for major error。 Furthermore； economic terrain that is forever shifting violently is ground on which it is difficult to build a fortress…like business franchise。 Such a franchise is usually the key to sustained high returns。
先前提到财星杂志的研究，可以充分支持我的论点，在1977年到1986年间，总计1；000家中只有25家能够达到连续十年平均股东权益报酬率达到20％的标准，且没有一年低于15％的双重标准，而这些优质企业同时也是股票市场上的宠儿，在所有的25家中有24家的表现超越S&P500指数。
The Fortune study I mentioned earlier supports our view。 Only 25 of the 1；000 panies met two tests of economic excellence … an average return on equity of over 20％ in the ten years； 1977 through 1986； and no year worse than 15％。 These business superstars were also stock market superstars： During the decade； 24 of the 25 outperformed the S&P 500。
这些财富之星可能让你大开眼界，首先相对于本身支付利息的能力，他们所运用的财务杠杆极其有限，一家真正好的公司是不需要借钱的，第二除了有一家是所谓的高科技公司，另外少数几家属于制药业以外，大多数的公司产业相当平凡普通，大部分现在销售的产品或服务与十年前大致相同，（虽然数量或是价格、或是两者都有，比以前高很多），这些公司的记录显示，充分运用现有产业地位，或是专注在单一领导的产品品牌之上通常是创造企业暴利的不二法门。
The Fortune champs may surprise you in two respects。 First； most use very little leverage pared to their interest…paying capacity。 Really good businesses usually don't need to borrow。 Second； except for one pany that is 〃high…tech〃 and several others that manufacture ethical drugs； the panies are in businesses that； on balance； seem rather mundane。 Most sell non…sexy products or serv