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In this plain…vanilla case； a director who sees something he doesn't like should attempt to persuade the other directors of his views。 If he is successful； the board will have the muscle to make the appropriate change。 Suppose； though； that the unhappy director can't get other directors to agree with him。 He should then feel free to make his views known to the absentee owners。 Directors seldom do that； of course。 The temperament of many directors would in fact be inpatible with critical behavior of that sort。 But I see nothing improper in such actions； assuming the issues are serious。 Naturally； the plaining director can expect a vigorous rebuttal from the unpersuaded directors； a prospect that should discourage the dissenter from pursuing trivial or non…rational causes。
在这种一般常见的情况下，当个别董事发觉有不合理的现象时，应该试着说服其他董事有关他的看法，若能够成功，那么董事会就有能力做出适当的决定，但是假设要是这位落寞的董事孤掌难鸣，无法获得其它董事的支持，那么他就应该要让没能出席的股东知道他的看法，当然很少有董事真的这样做，很多的董事事实上并没有足够的胆识敢做这样大胆的动作，但我却认为这样的举动并没有什么不妥，当然假设问题真的很严重的话，自然而然发出不平之鸣的董事一定会遭到其他不认同看法的董事严正的驳斥，认为反对的董事不要在枝微末节或是非理性的原因上捣乱。
For the boards just discussed； I believe the directors ought to be relatively few in number … say； ten or less … and ought to e mostly from the outside。 The outside board members should establish standards for the CEO's performance and should also periodically meet； without his being present； to evaluate his performance against those standards。
对于前述讨论的董事会形态，我认为董事的人数不必太多，最好是十个以内，同时大部分成员应该从外部遴选，而外部董事应该要能够建立对CEO表现的评核制度，并定期聚会，在CEO不在场的情况下，依据这些原则评断其表现。
The requisites for board membership should be business savvy； interest in the job； and owner…orientation。 Too often； directors are selected simply because they are prominent or add diversity to the board。 That practice is a mistake。 Furthermore； mistakes in selecting directors are particularly serious because appointments are so hard to undo： The pleasant but vacuous director need never worry about job security。
至于董事会成员遴选的条件，并须具备商业经验、对这项角色有兴趣同时以股东利益为导向，只是目前大部分被遴选出来的董事，大多是因为他们的社会地位或只是为了增加董事会成员的多样化，这样的做法是错误的，更有甚至，这种错误还有后遗症，因为董事被任命之后就很难再加以撤消，好说话且没有意见的董事是不怕找不到位置的。
The second case is that existing at Berkshire； where the controlling owner is also the manager。 At some panies； this arrangement is facilitated by the existence of two classes of stock endowed with disproportionate voting power。 In these situations； it's obvious that the board does not act as an agent between owners and management and that the directors cannot effect chang，e except through persuasion。 Therefore； if the owner/manager is mediocre or worse … or is over…reaching … there is little a director can do about it except object。 If the directors having no connections to the owner/manager make a unified argument； it may well have some effect。 More likely it will not。
第二种就像是发生在Berkshire的，具控制权的大股东本身也是经营阶层，在某些公司，经过特殊的安排，将公司的股权按投票权重的不同分成两类，也会产生这种情况，在这种情况下，很明显的董事会并非所有权人与经营阶层之间的中介，且除非经由劝说，否则董事会很难发挥改变的影响力，也因此要是老板经营者本身的能力平庸或很差劲或不顾他人，则董事除了表示反对以外，别无他法，而要是与老板经营者没有关系的董事碰巧做出相同的结论，有时或许还有用，但大部分的状况下是无济于事的。
If change does not e； and the matter is sufficiently serious； the outside directors should resign。 Their resignation will signal their doubts about management； and it will emphasize that no outsider is in a position to correct the owner/manager's shortings。
而要是公司无法做出改变，且情况演变的很严重时，外部董事就应该要辞职，外部董事的辞职等于是对现有的经营阶层投下反对票，同时凸显外部董事没有能力纠正老板经营者缺失的现象。
The third governance case occurs when there is a controlling owner who is not involved in management。 This case； examples of which are Hershey Foods and Dow Jones； puts the outside directors in a potentially useful position。 If they bee unhappy with either the petence or integrity of the manager； they can go directly to the owner （who may also be on the board） and report their dissatisfaction。 This situation is ideal for an outside director； since he need make his case only to a single； presumably interested owner； who can forthwith effect change if the argument is persuasive。 Even so； the dissatisfied director has only that single course of action。 If he remains unsatisfied about a critical matter； he has no choice but to resign。
第三种情况是公司拥有具控制权的大股东，但却不参与公司经营，这种特殊个案在现实社会中有Hershey食品与道琼公司等例子，公司能够充分运用外部董事的能力，若是董事们对于经营阶层的能力或品格感到不满意，他们可以直接向大股东反应（当然大股东可能也是董事成员），这种环境相当适合外部董事的发挥，因为他只需要将情况向单一且关心公司前景的所有权人报告，同时只要论点理由充分就可以马上发挥改变的效果，但即便如此，有意见的董事也只能有这样的选择管道，若是他对于特定事情的处理结果不满意，他还是只能辞职而别无其它选择。
Logically； the third case should be the most effective in insuring first…class management。 In the second case the owner is not going to fire himself； and in the first case； directors often find it very difficult to deal with mediocrity or mild over…reaching。 Unless the unhappy directors can win over a majority of the board … an awkward social and logistical task； particularly if management's behavior is merely odious； not egregious … their hands are effectively tied。 In practice； directors trapped in situations of this kind usually convince themselves that by staying around they can do at least some good。 Meanwhile； management proceeds unfettered。
理论上，第三种情况最能够确保一流的经营阶层存在，因为第二种情况，老板不可能把自己给Fire掉，而第一种情况，董事们通常很难与表现平庸又难以驾驭的经理人打交道，而除非那些有意见的董事能够获得董事会多数的支持，这是一件很困难的协调沟通任务，尤其