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1。 The first negative was produced by a change in Generally Accepted Accounting Principles （GAAP） having to do with the taxes we accrue against unrealized appreciation in the securities wecarry at market value。 The old rule said that the tax rate used should be the one in effect when the appreciation took place。 Therefore； at the end of 1992； we were using a rate of 34％ on the 6。4 billion of gains generated after 1986 and 28％ on the 1。2 billion of gains generated before that。 The new rule stipulates that the current tax rate should be applied to all gains。 The rate in the first quarter of 1993； when this rule went into effect； was 34％。Applying that rate to our pre…1987 gains reduced net worth by 70 million。
1．一个负面因素是由于一般公认会计原则变动所造成，主要与帐上依照市价计算的未实现增值利益所估列的所得税有关，原来规定税率必须按照涨价所发生时点来计算，因此在1992年底，我们的未实现利益也64亿美元系按照34％计算，其余12亿则按28％计算；而新的规定则改成全部依照现行税率计算，故1993年第一季所适用的税率则为34％，包含1987年以前的未实现利得在内全部适用，此举将使得我们的净值因此减少7；000万美元。
2。 The second negative； related to the first； came about because the corporate tax rate was raised in the third quarter of 1993 to 35％。 This change required us to make an additional charge of 1％ against all of our unrealized gains； and that charge penalized net worth by 75 million。 Oddly； GAAP required both this charge and the one described above to be deducted from the earnings we report； even though the unrealized appreciation that gave rise to the charges was never included in earnings； but rather was credited directly to net worth。
2。第二个负面因素与第一个也有关，因为从1993年开始企业税率提高为35％，此举又使得我们必须为帐上未实现利得多提1％的税负，导致我们的净值又减少7；500万美元，奇怪的是一般公认会计原则要求这两项变动皆须列入损益表，却不顾当初这些未实现利得根本就从未列入盈余之内，而是直接当作是净值的增加。
3。 Another 1993 change in GAAP affects the value at which we carry the securities that we own。 In recent years； both the mon stocks and certain mon…equivalent securities held by our insurance panies have been valued at market； whereas equities held by our non…insurance subsidiaries or by the parent pany were carried at their aggregate cost or market； whichever was lower。 Now GAAP says that all mon stocks should be carried at market； a rule we began following in the fourth quarter of 1993。 This change produced a gain in Berkshire's reported net worth of about 172million。
3。1993年另外一个会计原则的变动影响的则是我们帐上持有的这些有价证券的价值，近几年来，我们保险公司所持有的不管是普通股或是约当普通股，都是按市价计算，至于母公司或是其它非保险业子公司所持有的的股票则以成本与市价孰低法计算，现在一般公认会计原则则改成全部都按市价计算，这个规定将从1993年的第四季开始实施，此举将使得Berkshire的净值增加1。72亿美元。
4。 Finally； we issued some stock last year。 In a transaction described in last year's Annual Report； we issued 3；944 shares in early January； 1993 upon the conversion of 46 million convertible debentures that we had called for redemption。 Additionally； we issued 25；203 shares when we acquired Dexter Shoe； a purchase discussed later in this report。 The overall result was that our shares outstanding increased by 29；147 and our net worth by about 478 million。 Per…share book value also grew； because the shares issued in these transactions carried a price above their book value。
4。最后去年我们又发行的一些股份，在一项去年曾提过的购并交易中，我们在1993年一月将4；600万美元的可转换债券赎回，而发行了3；944股，此外在买下Dexter鞋业时，（后面报告还会详加叙述）我们又发行了25；203股，总计一共新发行了29；147股，增加4。78亿美元的净值，每股帐面净值也因发行价格高于原先帐面每股净值而提升。
Of course； it's per…share intrinsic value； not book value； that counts。 Book value is an accounting term that measures the capital； including retained earnings； that has been put into a business。 Intrinsic value is a present…value estimate of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life。 At most panies； the two values are unrelated。 Berkshire； however； is an exception： Our book value； though significantly below our intrinsic value； serves as a useful device for tracking that key figure。 In 1993； each measure grew by roughly 14％； advances that I would call satisfactory but unexciting。
当然真正重要的是每股实质价值而非帐面净值，帐面净值是一个会计名词，用来衡量一家公司所投入的资本，也包含未分配的盈余在内，实质价值则是对于一家企业终其一生所能产生现金流量的估计折现值，对大部分的公司来说，这两个数字大多不相关，不过Berkshire算是一个例外，我们的帐面净值，虽然远低于实质价值，但却是追踪实质价值相当好的一项指针，在1993年两项数值大约皆以14％左右的比率增加，这种成绩虽让人满意却不令人惊喜。
These gains； however； were outstripped by a much larger gain … 39％ … in Berkshire's market price。 Over time； of course； market price and intrinsic value will arrive at about the same destination。 But in the short run the two often diverge in a major way； a phenomenon I've discussed in the past。 Two years ago； Coca…Cola and Gillette； both large holdings of ours； enjoyed market price increases that dramatically outpaced their earnings gains。 In the 1991 Annual Report； I said that the stocks of these panies could not continuously overperform their businesses。
这些利得比起Berkshire本身股价39％的涨幅来说还是略微逊色，当然就长期而言，Berkshire的市价与实质价值将会到达相同的水平，但短期而言，两者的变化可能会有很大的差异，这种现象稍后我们会再详细讨论，两年前我们两项主要的投资可口可乐与吉列刮胡刀的股价表现远超过本身的盈余成长，在1991年的年报中，我便说过这些公司的股票市价不可能永远持续超越其本业。
From 1991 to 1993； Coke and Gillette increased their annual operating earnings per share by 38％ and 37％ respectively； but their market prices moved up only 11％ and 6％。 In other words； the panies overperformed their stocks； a result that no doubt partly reflects Wall Street's new apprehension about brand names。 Whatever the reason； what will count over time is the earnings performance of these panies。 If they prosper； Berkshire will also prosper； though not in a lock…step manner。
从1991年到1993年，可口可乐与吉列刮胡刀每股获利的增加幅度分别为38％与37％，但是同期间股票市价的涨幅却只有11％与6％，�