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Within the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group； Campbell Hausfeld； its largest unit； had a particularly fine year。 This pany； the country's leading producer of small and medium…sized air pressors； achieved record sales of 109 million； more than 30％ of which came from products introduced during the last five years。
至于史考特飞兹制造公司部份，最大的单位Campbell Hausfeld今年的表现特别好，它是全美中小型空气压缩机的领导品牌，年度营业额创下1。09亿美元的新高，其中有30％的营收系来自于最近五年新推出的产品。
In looking at the figures for our non…insurance operations； you will see that net worth increased by only 47 million in 1990 although earnings were 133 million。 This does not mean that our managers are in any way skimping on investments that strengthen their business franchises or that promote growth。 Indeed； they diligently pursue both goals。
在看我们非保险业的营运数字时，大家可能会好奇为何我们年度的盈余有1。33亿美元，但净值却只增加了4；700万美元呢？ 这并不代表我们的经理人用任何方法来掩盖其公司的经济实力或成长潜力，事实上他们无不努力追求这些目标。
But they also never deploy capital without good reason。 The result： In the past five years they have funneled well over 80％ of their earnings to Charlie and me for use in new business and investment opportunities。
不过他们也从不会毫无理由地浪费资金，过去五年以来他们将所赚得的80％盈余送回母公司，交给查理跟我运用在新的事业与投资机会之上。
Insurance Operations保险业营运
Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the property…casualty insurance industry：
下表是产物意外险业的最新的几项重要指数
Yearly Change bined Ratio Yearly Change Inflation Ratein Premiums After Policyholder in Incurred Measured byWritten （％） Dividends Losses （％） GNP Deflator （％）
1981 1982 。 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 （Revised） 1990（Est。）
3。8 3。7 5。0 8。5 22。1 22。2 9。4 4。4 3。2 4。5
106。0 109。6 112。0 118。0 116。3 108。0 104。6 105。4 109。2 109。8
6。5 8。4 6。8 16。9 16。1 13。5 7。8 5。5 7。7 4。1
9。6 6。5 3。8 3。8 3。0 2。6 3。1 3。3 4。1 5。0
Source： A。M。 Best Co。
The bined ratio represents total insurance costs （losses incurred plus expenses） pared to revenue from premiums： A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit； and one above 100 indicates a loss。 The higher the ratio； the worse the year。 When the investment ine that an insurer earns from holding policyholders' funds （〃the float〃） is taken into account； a bined ratio in the 107 … 111 range typically produces an overall breakeven result； exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders。
综合比率代表保险的总成本（理赔损失加上费用）占保费收入的比例，比率在100以下代表有承保的损失，在100以上则代表有承保的获利综合比率代表的是保险的总成本（损失加上费用）占保费收入的比率，100以下代表会有承销利益，100以上代表会有承销损失，若把持有保费收入浮存金（扣除股东权益部份所产生的盈余）所产生的投资收益列入考量，损益两平的范围大概是在107…111之间。
For the reasons laid out in previous reports； we expect the industry's incurred losses to grow at an average of 10％ annually； even in periods when general inflation runs considerably lower。 （Over the last 25 years； incurred losses have in reality grown at a still faster rate； 11％。） If premium growth meanwhile materially lags that 10％ rate； underwriting losses will mount； though the industry's tendency to under…reserve when business turns bad may obscure their size for a time。
基于前几次年报所说明的理由，即使是通货膨胀在这几年来相对温和，我们预期保险业每年损失增加的比率约在10％左右，若是保费收入成长没有到达10％以上，损失一定会增加，（事实上过去25年以来，理赔损失系以11％的速度在成长），虽然保险公司在景气不好时，会习惯性地将损失暂时隐藏起来。
Last year premium growth fell far short of the required 10％ and underwriting results therefore worsened。 （In our table； however； the severity of the deterioration in 1990 is masked because the industry's 1989 losses from Hurricane Hugo caused the ratio for that year to be somewhat above trendline。） The bined ratio will again increase in 1991； probably by about two points。
去年保费收入的成长远低于最基本的10％要求，承保成绩可想而知会继续恶化， （不过在这张表上，1990年恶化的程度因为1989年发生Hugo飓风钜额损失而被略微掩盖），1991年的综合比率将会再度恶化，有可能会增加2个百分点以上。
Results will improve only when most insurance managements bee so fearful that they run from business； even though it can be done at much higher prices than now exist。 At some point these managements will indeed get the message： The most important thing to do when you find yourself in a hole is to stop digging。 But so farthat point hasn't gotten across： Insurance managers continue to dig … sullenly but vigorously。
虽然以现在的市场状况保险业者大可以用比现在更高的价格来作生意，但营运结果却只可能在所有的保险公司主管因为恐惧而远离市场时才有可能好转，就某种程度而言，这些经理人应该已经收到了一些讯息，当你发现自己深陷洞中最重要的一件事就是不要再挖了，不过这个临界点显然还没到，许多保险公司虽然不甘愿但还是用力地在挖洞。
The picture would change quickly if a major physical or financial catastrophe were to occur。 Absent such a shock； one to two years will likely pass before underwriting losses bee large enough to raise management fear to a level that would spur major price increases。 When that moment arrives； Berkshire will be ready … both financially and psychologically … to write huge amounts of business。
还好这种情况可能在发生重大的天然灾害或金融风暴后很快地改变，但若是没有这类事件发生，可能还要再等一、两年，直到所有的保险公司受不了钜额的承保损失，才有可能迫使经理人大幅提高保费，而等那个时刻到来时，Berkshire一定会作好准备，不论是在财务上或是心理上，等着接下大笔大笔的保单。
In the meantime； our insurance volume continues to be small but satisfactory。 In the next section of this report we will give you a framework for evaluating insurance results。 From that discussion； you will gain an understanding of why I am so enthusiastic about the performance of our insurance manager； Mike Goldberg； and his cadre of stars； Rod Eldred； Dinos Iordanou； Ajit Jain； and Don Wurster。
在此同时，我们的保费收入虽然很少但还是处于可以接受的范围，在下一段报告中我会告诉大家如何去衡量保险公司的绩效表现，看完之后你就会明了，为何我对我们的保险事业经理人，包含Mike Goldberg与他的明星团队Rod El